Concept map: Untrusted input boundaries
Prerequisites (two levels) and direct dependents of Untrusted input boundaries. Show everything
- 2prerequisites shown
- 3direct dependents
- 4lessons use it
Insights 29
- Separate instructions from pasted data with clear delimiters, but do not call it security
- Apply document permissions inside the retriever, before the model sees anything
- Prefer narrow, purpose-built tools over generic ones like raw SQL or HTTP
- Treat writes to long-term agent memory as untrusted input with provenance
- Treat retrieved and tool-returned text as data, and enforce limits outside the model
- Assume the system prompt will leak, so never put secrets or access rules only there
- Close exfiltration channels such as auto-loaded links and images in model output
- Encode or parameterise model output before it reaches SQL, HTML or a shell
Projects 10
- Flagship: passenger-rights document Q&A with a retrieval baseline, one controlled improvement and an honest generation mode
- Hybrid lexical/latent retrieval and lightweight reranking ablation over the academy's own knowledge base
- Chunking experiment on long technical papers: evidence recall at a fixed context budget
- Structured extraction from disruption notices: JSON-schema validation, safe repair and injected-instruction detection
- Tool-calling agent vs deterministic workflow for rebooking proposals after a cancellation
- Prompt-injection red-team harness for a product-Q&A assistant, run on safe fixtures
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