Concept map: Prompt injection and AI security
Prerequisites (two levels) and direct dependents of Prompt injection and AI security. Show everything
- 3prerequisites shown
- 1direct dependents
- 2lessons use it
Insights 17
- Expose only the tools a task needs, as an explicit allow-list per route
- Treat retrieved and tool-returned text as data, and enforce limits outside the model
- Assume the system prompt will leak, so never put secrets or access rules only there
- Close exfiltration channels such as auto-loaded links and images in model output
- Keep the model that reads untrusted content away from tools and private data
- Fix the plan before reading untrusted data when the task allows it
- A schema-valid tool call can still be unauthorised, so authorise every call downstream
- Let tools act with the requesting user's permissions, not a shared superuser account
Projects 7
- Flagship: passenger-rights document Q&A with a retrieval baseline, one controlled improvement and an honest generation mode
- Structured extraction from disruption notices: JSON-schema validation, safe repair and injected-instruction detection
- Prompt-injection red-team harness for a product-Q&A assistant, run on safe fixtures
- Cost and latency routing study: small model, large model, router and cascade on checkable answers
- Embedding drift monitoring for a virtual assistant, evaluated on simulated traffic with known injected shifts
- PII redaction pipeline evaluation before documents cross an LLM trust boundary
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