LLMs, GenAI, RAG, agents, evaluation · insight-1574
Give a sandboxed agent a domain allow-list for egress instead of all-or-nothing network access
- Evidence type
- documented fact
- Difficulty
- medium
- Roles
- ML engineer, Applied AI
- Industries
- cross-industry
Summary: situation, action, reason, boundary
Situation
A coding agent in a sandbox needs to install packages, but the team has either cut the network entirely or opened it fully.
Action
Route outbound traffic through a proxy outside the sandbox that permits only named domains, such as the package index, logs denied requests, and requires an explicit decision to add a new domain, alongside filesystem limits.
Reason
Anthropic describes needing both filesystem and network isolation, with a proxy that restricts reachable domains and asks for confirmation of new ones.
Boundary
Agents that execute code or commands and need limited network access.
Symptom or risk
With no network the agent cannot work, and with a full network a manipulated agent can send out files or secrets.
Exceptions
Fully offline tasks should keep the network closed.
Trade-offs
Allow-lists need upkeep, and allowed domains can still host attacker-controlled content.
Pitfalls
Allowing broad domains, such as a general file host, that can receive uploads.
Lessons and concepts
Claims and their sources
Anthropic states that both filesystem and network isolation are needed, and describes a proxy outside the sandbox that restricts which domains a process can reach and asks the user to confirm new domains.